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The Persistence of Segregation in the 21st 
Century 
Paul A. Jargowsky† 
Introduction 
Residential segregation has long been regarded as one of the 
key pillars sustaining racial inequality.  The Kerner Commission, 
formed to investigate the causes of the race riots of the 1960s, found 
that “[s]egregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a 
destructive environment totally unknown to most [W]hite 
Americans.”1  Moreover, progress against racial inequality could not 
be achieved, they concluded, as long as we continue to move towards 
“two societies, one [B]lack, one [W]hite—separate and unequal.”2  
Such concerns were the impetus for a variety of strategies and 
legislative acts to break down the separation of the races, including 
school desegregation and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.  Fifty years 
down the road from those tumultuous times, it is fair to ask whether 
we have made progress against racial segregation.3 
Two prominent economists, Edward Glaeser of Harvard 
University and Jacob Vigdor of Duke University, conducted a 
widely-cited study of segregation over the last one-hundred and 
twenty years in the United States.4  Their report, provocatively 
titled The End of the Segregated Century, documented the rapid rise 
 
 †. This paper is an extension of remarks delivered at the Summit for Civil 
Rights at the University of Minnesota Law School, November 9–10, 2017.  Some of 
the research results reported herein were funded through a grant from the National 
Science Foundation, Award 1636520.  I received helpful comments and suggestions 
from Natasha Fletcher, Christopher Wheeler, and participants at the Summit.  
Comments and suggestions welcome; please direct them to 
paul.jargowsky@rutgers.edu. 
 1. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968) [hereinafter THE KERNER 
REPORT]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act), Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 
81–90 (1968). 
 4. EDWARD GLAESER & JACOB VIGDOR, THE END OF THE SEGREGATED CENTURY: 
RACIAL SEPARATION IN AMERICA’S NEIGHBORHOODS, 1890–2010, at 1–26 (2012) 
[hereinafter GLAESER & VIGDOR, THE END OF THE SEGREGATED CENTURY]; see also 
David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser & Jacob L. Vigdor, The Rise and Decline of the 
American Ghetto, 107 J. POL. ECON. 455, 455–506 (1999) (examining segregation in 
United States cities from 1890 to 1990). 
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in segregation from 1890 through 1970, as well as the “no less 
dramatic” decline since 1970.5  Among other findings, they report 
that as of 2010, United States metropolitan areas were more 
integrated than at any time since 1910; that completely White 
neighborhoods were effectively extinct; and that Black ghettos were 
in rapid decline.6  Yet, they noted, “there has been only limited 
progress in closing achievement and employment gaps between 
[B]lacks and [W]hites.”7  They conclude that the belief and hope that 
reducing segregation would facilitate progress towards racial 
equality was misguided:  “[f]orty years later,” they argue, “we know 
that this dream was a myth.”8 
In this article, I argue that their optimism about racial 
segregation’s decline and their pessimism about the potential 
benefits of reducing racial segregation are incorrect on several 
counts.  First, while there has been some progress in reducing 
segregation by race in United States metropolitan areas, certain 
methodological aspects of Glaeser and Vigdor’s analysis led them to 
significantly overstate the extent of the decline.  Second, Glaeser 
and Vigdor failed to account for changes in economic segregation, 
which interacts with and reinforces the impact of racial segregation; 
in particular, economic segregation has been increasing in ways 
that negate some of the progress in racial segregation per se.  Third, 
they did not address the implications of sub-metropolitan geospatial 
patterns, which effectively limit the access of Blacks and Hispanics 
to important public amenities—notably, high-quality public 
education.  Fourth, they did not address life-cycle issues, 
specifically that children enrolled in school are more segregated 
than adults.  Given that public education is organized 
geographically, the higher segregation of children renders the 
decline in segregation less meaningful in terms of access to 
opportunity than it appears from the overall numbers.  Thus, the 
facts on the ground are bleaker than suggested in Glaeser and 
Vidgor’s analysis, and, as a result, they were incorrect to dismiss 
the potential benefit of racial integration to reduce social and 
economic disparities. 
Part I explores the trends in racial segregation and shows how 
Glaeser and Vigdor’s conclusions depend in part on a measurement 
scheme that I argue is questionable.  I also revisit the trends using 
 
 5. GLAESER & VIGDOR, THE END OF THE SEGREGATED CENTURY, supra note 4, 
at 4. 
 6. Id. at 1–26. 
 7. Id. at 10. 
 8. Id. 
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the approach that is more common in sociological analyses.  
Following that, in Part II I examine the distinct but related 
phenomenon of economic segregation.  Contrary to racial 
segregation, economic segregation has been increasing.  Given how 
these forms of segregation intersect and interact, the rise of 
economic segregation has implications for understanding the 
significance of racial segregation in the current context.  Part III 
addresses the changing geographic basis of racial segregation, 
showing that it increasingly is structured by municipal boundaries, 
which has great significance given the importance of those 
boundaries in limiting access to economic opportunities and public 
amenities.  The penultimate section, Part IV, addresses how life-
cycle differences in segregation have led to greater segregation 
among children, which is a concern because children are the age 
group most susceptible to segregation’s negative effects.  Finally, 
the concluding section addresses what we learn from this analysis 
about the persistence of racial segregation in the twenty-first 
century. 
I. Racial Segregation 
Segregation is defined as the separation of distinct groups into 
separate conditions.  One can speak of occupational segregation by 
gender, educational segregation of pupils of different races into 
different schools or classrooms, or the economic segregation of social 
classes to different types of communities.  In the United States, the 
term most often refers to racial residential segregation—that is, the 
segregation of persons of different races and ethnicities into 
different neighborhoods. 
A. Measuring Racial Segregation 
If segregation is separation, then its opposite is an even 
distribution of groups across the outcome of interest.  There are 
many ways to measure segregation, but by far the most common is 
the Index of Dissimilarity,9 which equals 0 when the distribution of 
two groups is perfectly even and 100 if the two groups are 
completely separated.10  While the Index of Dissimilarity has been 
criticized on various methodological grounds,11 in practice it is 
 
 9. Otis Dudley Duncan & Beverly Duncan, A Methodological Analysis of 
Segregation Indexes, 20 AM. SOC. REV. 210, 211 (1955) (describing the Index of 
Dissimilarity as the “Nonwhite Section Index”). 
 10. Christopher Winship, A Revaluation of Indexes of Residential Segregation, 55 
SOC. FORCES 1058, 1059 (1977). 
 11. Id. at 1058, 1061–62, 1065. 
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highly correlated with other measures that focus on the evenness of 
the distribution of groups across neighborhoods.12  The value of the 
Index may be interpreted as the proportion of one group that would 
have to move to achieve complete integration.13  In general, 
segregation levels of thirty or below are considered low, above thirty 
and up to seventy are considered moderate, and values above 
seventy are considered high.14 
To calculate the Index of Dissimilarity, one needs to define two 
distinct groups and look at their distribution across smaller units 
(neighborhoods) within a larger unit (usually a housing market).  
For neighborhoods, I follow the common practice, as do Glaeser and 
Vigdor, of using Census tracts; these are small geographic units 
defined by the United States Census Bureau for data collection 
purposes that average about 4,000 residents.15  I use 
contemporaneous census tracts rather than tracts with boundaries 
normalized to a given year.  Tracts as drawn in any given Census 
year are the best representation of neighborhoods in those years.  
This keeps the average population size of the neighborhood units 
more consistent over time, and it is well known that segregation 
measures are sensitive to the size of neighborhood units employed.16  
For housing markets, I use metropolitan areas, which are cities of 
50,000 or more residents, the county in which the central city is 
located, and surrounding counties that are closely tied to the central 
county by commuting patterns and other factors.17  For 1990 and 
2000, I draw from the long form data from the United States Census 
for those years.  For 2010, because a comparable long form survey 
was not conducted, I use the American Community Survey file that 
spans 2008–2012, a period centered on 2010. 
 
 12. Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, The Dimensions of Racial 
Segregation, 67 SOC. FORCES 281, 284–87 (1988). 
 13. Winship, supra note 10, at 1061. 
 14. NATHAN KANTROWITZ, ETHNIC AND RACIAL SEGREGATION IN THE NEW YORK 
METROPOLIS 15 (1973). 
 15. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GEOGRAPHIC AREAS REFERENCE MANUAL 1–3 
(1994). 
 16. S. Openshaw, Ecological Fallacies and the Analysis of Areal Census Data, 16 
ENV’T & PLAN. A 17, 18 (1984) (“Indeed, it is now known that the modifiable nature 
of areal units can be systematically exploited by heuristic procedures to produce a 
very wide range of different results, irrespective of what individual-level analysis 
would have produced . . . .”); Sean F. Reardon & David O’Sullivan, Measures of 
Spatial Segregation, 34 SOC. METHODOLOGY 121, 123 (2004) (“Aspatial segregation 
measures have been repeatedly criticized in the residential segregation context for 
their failure to account for the spatial patterning of census tracts . . . .”). 
 17. 2010 Standards for Delineating Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical 
Areas, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,245, 37,252 (June 28, 2010). 
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B. Segregation of Who from Whom? 
An important issue is how to define the two groups whose 
segregation is to be measured.  Glaeser and Vigdor consider the 
segregation of Blacks from all other persons, i.e. Blacks from non-
Blacks.  This is a crucial and, I would argue, incorrect decision.  The 
whole point of segregation studies is that a segregated group is 
excluded from contact with a powerful advantaged group and 
geographically isolated from the resources, housing, and public 
amenities that the advantaged group enjoys.  Therefore, a 
conceptually valid measurement scheme should measure 
segregation of minority and disadvantaged groups from the 
majority group.  If Blacks more frequently reside with low-income 
Hispanic immigrants, that does not mean they have achieved better 
access to high-performing schools, safer streets, and quality 
housing.  The more logical approach to segregation analysis is to 
calculate the segregation of minority groups from the advantaged 
majority group, in other words, from non-Hispanic Whites.18  The 
choice between Black/non-Black and Black/White makes a large 
difference in the analysis, both in terms of the measured levels of 
segregation and the trends over time, as we see in the following 
section.19 
C. Segregation by Race Is Declining, but How Fast? 
Glaeser and Vigdor, consistent with past studies,20 show that 
Black versus non-Black segregation increased dramatically in the 
early decades of the twentieth century during the Great Migration 
of southern Blacks to northern industrial cities.21  By their measure, 
 
 18. Another measurement issue is that residents of group quarters should be 
excluded from the analysis.  Residents of jails and nursing homes do not interact in 
the same way with other residents of a neighborhood.  When a minority group 
member is arrested in New York City and sent “upstate,” this does not advance the 
cause of integration.  I have excluded them in my calculations, but I am not sure how 
Glaeser and Vigdor handled the issue.  Fortunately, the number of group quarters 
residents is small in most tracts and the effect on the numbers is negligible. 
 19. It should also be noted that race is self-identified and that starting in the 
2000 Census, individuals could select more than one race.  Reynolds Farley, Racial 
Identities in 2000: The Response to the Multiple-Race Response Option, in THE NEW 
RACE QUESTION: HOW THE CENSUS COUNTS MULTIRACIAL INDIVIDUALS 33, 33 (Joel 
Perlmann & Mary C. Waters eds., 2002).  However, very few individuals chose to do 
so, and all analyses here are based on people who identified as White alone or Black 
alone, excluding those who identified as Hispanic.  Id. at 45. 
 20. Douglas S. Massey & Zoltan L. Hajnal, The Changing Geographic Structure 
of Black-White Segregation in the United States, 76 SOC. SCI. Q. 527 (1995); DOUGLAS 
S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE 
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). 
 21. GLAESER & VIGDOR, THE END OF THE SEGREGATED CENTURY, supra note 4, 
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the Index of Dissimilarity peaked at about eighty percent in 1970.22  
Since then, they find a dramatic decline to about fifty-five percent 
in 2010, the lowest level since 1910 and the basis of their declaring 
“the end of the segregated century.”23 
However, a good part of the decline they report is driven by 
their choice of racial groups.  As Hispanic and Asian immigrants 
arrived, they typically settled in urban population centers in areas 
of low-cost housing—in other words, in and around Black 
neighborhoods.24  Using a Black/non-Black metric, the mingling of 
Blacks with other minority groups shows up as integration.25 
Figure 1 below compares the Black/non-Black approach to the 
Index of Dissimilarity between Blacks and non-Hispanic Whites 
between 1990 and 2010.26  During that period, the proportion of the 
population of the 384 metropolitan areas that was neither White 
nor Black nearly tripled, rising from 10% in 1990 to 28% in 2010.  
The 7.6-point drop in dissimilarity shown by Glaeser and Vigdor, 
from 65 to 57.4 (-12%) is not reflected in the figures that use Blacks 
and non-Hispanic Whites as the groups.  While the level in 1990 
was comparable to the Black/non-Black figure, the decline was 
much smaller, only 4.3 points on a base of 67.3 (-6%).  By their choice 
of groups on which to compute the Index, Glaeser and Vigdor 
exaggerated the extent of the decline relative to 1990. 
 
at 3. 
 22. Id. at 4, fig. 1. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 9–10. 
 25. Id. at 2–9. 
 26. The segregation values in this bar chart, as well as all calculations reported 
in the figures and text below that are not attributed to another source, were 
calculated by the author from the Census data described above. 
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Figure 1. Index of Dissimilarity, 1990–2010, Average of 384 
Metroplitan Areas 
The importance of this choice can also be seen by looking at the 
values for specific cities. 
Table 1 shows the Index of Dissimilarity computed both 
ways for the twenty largest metropolitan areas in 1990 and 2010.27  
The Index of Dissimilarity computed between Blacks and non-
Hispanic Whites is always larger than when it is computed between 
Blacks and non-Blacks; in fact, it cannot be less.  In 1990, however, 
the differences were mostly small, with the exceptions of New York 
and Los Angeles.  By 2010, the difference between the two measures 
was also greater than in 1990, sometimes dramatically so; it more 
than doubled in fifteen of the twenty metropolitan areas, reflecting 
the increasing tendency of Blacks to share neighborhoods with the 
growing numbers of Hispanic and Asian immigrants.  
 
 27. The figures for 2010 differ slightly for some metropolitan areas from those 
shown in Table 1 of Glaeser and Vigdor due to differences in data sources and 
geographic concepts.  GLAESER & VIGDOR, THE END OF THE SEGREGATED CENTURY, 
supra note 4. 
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Table 1. Comparison of Black/Non-Black and Black/White 
Indices of Dissimilarity, Twenty Largest Metropolitan 
Areas, 1990 and 2010 
As a result, the apparent decline in racial segregation was 
larger using the Glaeser-Vigdor measure for all twenty 
metropolitan areas.  In Houston, for example, the decline of twelve 
points in dissimilarity of Blacks versus non-Blacks was only three 
points when comparing Blacks and Whites.  In Denver, the apparent 
improvement of five points is almost completely eliminated using 
the Black/White approach.  Riverside-San Bernardino showed a 
small decline by the Black/non-Black measure but actually had an 
increase in segregation using the Black/White measure.  Santa Ana-
Anaheim-Irvine bucked the trend by showing an increase in both 
measures, but the increase was larger when contrasting Blacks and 
Whites.  In these large metropolitan areas, on average there was 
progress by both measures, but using the Black/non-Black Index of 
Dissimilarity greatly exaggerated the progress toward racial 
integration.  While it is true that over this period Blacks were less 
likely to live alone in neighborhoods, to a large extent this reflected 
an influx of immigrants rather than achieving access to non-
Hispanic White neighborhoods and the resources and public 
amenities they possess.  To better capture this reality, for the 
remainder of the Article, racial segregation is measured by applying 
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the Index of Dissimilarity to Blacks as compared to non-Hispanic 
Whites. 
D. Segregation Is Highest Where Blacks Actually Live 
Segregation of Blacks from non-Hispanic Whites is 
substantially worse in metropolitan areas with larger Black 
populations.  Figure 2 shows the segregation levels of the 384 
metropolitan areas graphed against the log of the number of Black 
residents.  The bivariate regression line, as shown in the figure, 
indicates that the Index of Dissimilarity increases by 0.5 points for 
every 10% increase in Black population (t=14.27, p<0.001).  
Metropolitan areas with lower segregation levels tend to have fewer 
than 100,000 Black residents, but those areas with more than 
500,000 Black residents virtually all have high segregation levels.  
As a result, more than half of all metropolitan Blacks lived in areas 
where the 2010 Index of Dissimilarity was 60 or higher; one-fourth 
lived in areas where it was 70 or higher; and more than one in ten 
lived in one of the four metropolitan areas where the Index of 
Dissimilarity was 80 or more—New York (80.2), Detroit (81.2), 
Newark-Union (80.0), or Milwaukee (81.6). 
Figure 2. Segregation Between Blacks and Non-Hispanic 
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These figures show that segregation, far from having ended, is 
still a prominent feature of the United States metropolitan 
landscape.  That is not to say there has been no progress.  For 
example, as Glaeser and Vigdor point out, the number of census 
tracts with exactly zero Black residents declined from 4,700 in 1960 
to only 424 in 2010.28  However, a single Black resident in a 
neighborhood of thousands may not be that meaningful, so it is 
more insightful to look at broader categories of racial percentages, 
as shown in Table 2.  The change from 1990 to 2010 in the 
proportion of the Black population of metropolitan areas29 living in 
predominantly White neighborhoods—census tracts that were less 
than 10% Black—rose only a slight amount, from 13% to 14.3%, a 
much more modest change than implied by the “zero Black 
residents” figure.  The proportion of Blacks living in virtually all-
Black tracts—90% Black or more—declined substantially from 28% 
to 14%.30  Where did the other 14% go?  The fastest growth was in 
neighborhoods in the range of 10% to 40% Black.  Nearly 85% of the 
White population lived in neighborhoods where fewer than 10% of 
the residents were Black in 1990; while that declined, more than 
three-fourths of Whites still lived in such neighborhoods by 2010.  
These are positive changes, but not particularly large or dramatic 
ones.  
 
 28. GLAESER & VIGDOR, THE END OF THE SEGREGATED CENTURY, supra note 4, 
at 7.  Note that even this decline is an underestimate, because the number of census 
tracts increased from 22,688 to 72,531 as tracts were split to accommodate 
population growth and more areas of the country were divided into census tracts.  Id. 
 29. Note that about 90% of Blacks and 80% of Whites live in one of the 384 areas 
covered in the analysis as of 2010. 
 30. Note that this change could happen either by Blacks leaving tracts with 90% 
or more Black residents or by an influx of non-Black residents, leading the tract to 
be re-categorized as below 90%. 
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Table 2. Distribution of Metropolitan Area Residents by 
Percent Black, 1990–2010 
Another indication of progress is the decline in cities with 
extreme levels of segregation.  While 52% of Blacks still lived in 
metropolitan areas with segregation levels of 60 or more in 2010, as 
noted earlier, this is down from 75% in 1990.  And while 11% of 
metropolitan Blacks lived in metropolitan areas with Dissimilarity 
of 80 or more in 2010, that figure was down from 26% in 1990.  But 
at the pace of the decline in Black/non-Hispanic White segregation 
experienced over 1990 to 2010, it will be decades before it is reduced 
to levels comparable with other racial and ethnic minority groups 
today or the historical levels experienced by European immigrants 
at the peak of their segregation. 
II. Economic Segregation31 
Race is the preeminent dimension of residential segregation in 
the United States, but it is not the only one.  Poor, middle-class, and 
affluent households tend to live in very different neighborhoods, 
separated by walls, highways, railroad tracks, and municipal 
boundaries.  Metropolitan neighborhoods vary enormously in terms 
of residents’ incomes, housing size and conditions, and public 
amenities—from sheet-rock mansions surrounded by green lawns 
in wealthy suburban enclaves to run-down row homes and housing 
projects in depopulated central-city ghettos and barrios.  This 
phenomenon is known as economic segregation, and it serves to 
reinforce racial segregation and exacerbate its effects.32  Given that 
 
 31. This section draws heavily on Paul A. Jargowsky & Christopher Wheeler, 
Economic Segregation in US Metropolitan Areas, 1970–2010, (21st Century Cities 
Initiative, John Hopkins Univ., Nov. 2017), http://www.21stcentury
neighborhoods.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/jargowsky.pdf. 
 32. Douglas S. Massey, Jonathan Rothwell & Thurston Domina, The Changing 
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minority groups are poorer on average than non-Hispanic Whites, 
economic and racial segregation interact with each other to create 
neighborhoods which are doubly isolated from the mainstream of 
American society. 
Economic segregation, resulting in vastly unequal 
neighborhoods, is linked to many social and economic problems.  
Residents of high-poverty neighborhoods are systematically cut off 
from public resources in education, housing, and health care and 
simultaneously exposed to higher levels of crime, violence, and 
economic isolation.33  High-poverty neighborhoods have significant 
long-term consequences for their residents, particularly young 
children who grow up in such places.34  While residents of high-
poverty areas are harmed most directly, the costs of economic 
segregation are shared more broadly.35  Crime and violence incur 
substantial costs in terms of enhanced security, policing, court 
systems, and incarceration.36  Poor health outcomes among the 
uninsured and those with publicly-funded insurance drive up 
health care expenses.37  The costs, financial and otherwise, of these 
outcomes are passed on to more privileged residents of metropolitan 
areas wherever they might reside.38 
 
Bases of Segregation in the United States, 626 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 74, 77, 
87–88 (2009). 
 33. ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING 
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 46–49 (2012); PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN 
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 28–30 
(2013). 
 34. Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren & Lawrence F. Katz, The Effects of Exposure 
to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity 
Experiment, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 855, 858 (2016) [hereinafter Chetty, Hendren & 
Katz, Effects of Exposure]; Raj Chetty et al., Where is the Land of Opportunity? The 
Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1553, 
1611 (2014) [hereinafter Chetty et al., Land of Opportunity]; Patrick Sharkey, The 
Intergenerational Transmission of Context, 113 AM. J. SOC. 931, 933 (2008). 
 35. GREGORY ACS ET AL., THE COST OF SEGREGATION: NATIONAL TRENDS AND THE 
CASE OF CHICAGO, 1990–2010, at 18–27 (2017); PETER DREIER, JOHN MOLLENKOPF 
& TODD SWANSTROM, PLACE MATTERS: METROPOLITICS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 88–93 (3d ed. 2014). 
 36. ACS, supra note 35, at 6 (“In particular, [B]lacks living in hypersegregated 
areas are exposed to elevated levels of crime and violence, pervasive joblessness, 
lower levels of educational attainment, low collective efficacy, and chronic physical 
and psychological health conditions.”); DREIER, MOLLENKOPF & SWANSTROM, supra 
note 35, at 88–89. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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A. Measurement Issues 
Segregation on the basis of household income presents a 
challenge in terms of measurement because income is a continuous 
variable rather than a categorical one like race.  The poverty line 
does define two groups, poor and non-poor, whose segregation from 
each other can be measured using the Index of Dissimilarity.  
However, much of the variation in income is discarded by this 
approach, since a family of four with income slightly above the 
poverty line, say $26,000, is lumped together with multi-
millionaires.  Measurement of economic segregation requires a 
more sophisticated approach. 
In previous work, Jeongdai Kim and I developed a class of 
measures of segregation based on ideas from information theory 
that are particularly useful for measuring segregation on a 
continuous variable.39  We argued that economic segregation may 
be measured by computing the ratio of neighborhood inequality to 
household inequality.  The basic idea is that there is a certain 
amount of income inequality between households.  These 
households are then grouped into neighborhoods.  If there were 
perfect economic integration, all neighborhoods would be more or 
less equal; neighborhood inequality—the numerator in the ratio—
would be zero, and therefore, economic segregation would be zero as 
well.  In contrast, if there were perfect economic segregation, there 
would be no mixing of households of different income levels within 
neighborhoods.  The neighborhood and household inequality 
measures would then be the same, and thus, the segregation 
measure formed by their ratio would be 1.0.  While almost any 
measure of inequality can be used to form this ratio, the results 
presented below employ the well-known Gini Coefficient,40 which 
measures how unequally income is distributed across the household 
or neighborhood units.41 
 
 39. Paul A. Jargowsky & Jeongdai Kim, The Information Theory of Segregation: 
Uniting Segregation and Inequality in a Common Framework (Nat’l Poverty Ctr., 
Working Paper 09-05, 2009); Paul A. Jargowsky & Jeongdai Kim, The GINI 
Coefficient and Segregation on a Continuous Variable (Nat’l Poverty Ctr., Working 
Paper 05-2, 2005). 
 40. Corrado Gini, Measurement of Inequality of Incomes, 31 ECON. J. 124, 124–
26 (1921); THOMAS PIKETTY, THE ECONOMICS OF INEQUALITY 10 (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., 2015). 
 41. Other inequality measures, such as the Theil Index, could equally well be 
used.  An example is the Neighborhood Sorting Index, which is the ratio of the 
standard deviation of household income to the standard deviation of neighborhood 
income.  Paul A. Jargowsky, Take the Money and Run: Economic Segregation in U.S. 
Metropolitan Areas, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 984, 988 (1996). 
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The next section describes the trends in household inequality, 
neighborhood inequality, and economic segregation.  In addition to 
the data described above, this analysis includes information on 
household income from the U.S. Censuses conducted in 1970 and 
1980.42  Prior to the 1990 Census, census tracts had not been defined 
for the whole country.  For that reason, it is not possible to calculate 
segregation measures going back to 1970 for all 384 metropolitan 
areas.  These results use a set of 264 metropolitan areas that had 
sufficient data to track them over the whole period. 
B. Trends in Household and Neighborhood Inequality 
Income inequality increased dramatically in almost all United 
States metropolitan areas between 1970 and 2010.  Table 3 below 
shows the average statistics on household income distributions for 
264 metropolitan areas.  The average metropolitan area’s mean 
income was little changed in the 1970s, but increased rapidly from 
1980 to 2000, followed by a decline between 2000 and 2010, 
reflecting the financial crisis and the deep recession that followed.  
Despite that decline, real mean income rose 17% between 1970 and 
2010.  Incomes were also more variable; over the period, the 
standard deviation of household income increased by nearly 22%.  
The gains in household income were not widely shared, however.  
The first four quintiles of households—four-fifths of the 
population—actually experienced a decline in their share of total 
metropolitan income.  The second quintile—a good approximation 
of the working class—declined the fastest, dropping more than 18%.  
Meanwhile, the top fifth quintile saw its share of total income rise 
from 44.8% to 49.9%.  The rising tide lifted only the largest boats, 




 42. See CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, 1970, 
https://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html (last accessed Mar. 29, 2018); 
CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, 1980, 
https://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html (last accessed Mar. 29, 2018). 
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Table 3. Distribution of Household Income in the Average 
Metropolitan Area 
 
Clearly, household income inequality was increasing over this 
period.  Figure 3 shows the average Gini Index of Income Inequality 
for both households and neighborhoods relative to 1970 for the 264 
metropolitan areas.  Household inequality increased steadily 
starting in 1980, consistent with national and international trends 
showing that inequality began rising in the late 1970s.  
Neighborhood inequality rose faster than household inequality in 
the 1980s and 2000s; in the 1990s, household inequality grew faster.  
Over the whole period, however, neighborhood inequality in United 
States metropolitan areas clearly outpaced household inequality.  
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Figure 3. Gini Coefficients, Household and Neighborhood, 
Relative to 1970 
Household inequality is a precondition for economic 
segregation, just as there can be no racial segregation unless there 
are different racial groups.  Given a level of income inequality 
among households, economic segregation comes down to the 
question of how much inequality is between rather than within 
neighborhoods.  As household income inequality has risen, if the 
division of that inequality within and between neighborhoods had 
remained the same, neighborhood inequality would have increased 
at the same rate as household inequality.  As the figure shows, 
however, neighborhood inequality grew faster.  The implication is 
that neighborhoods became more unequal for two different reasons.  
First, there was simply a lot more inequality overall.  Second, 
households were sorted into neighborhoods in ways that led a 
greater proportion of household inequality to be between, rather 
than within neighborhoods.  In other words, economic segregation 
increased.43 
 
 43. Other approaches to measuring economic segregation reach the same 
conclusion.  See Sean F. Reardon & Kendra Bischoff, Income Inequality and Income 
Segregation, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1092, 1093 (2011); Ann Owens, Inequality in Children’s 
Contexts: Income Segregation of Households with and Without Children, 81 AM. SOC. 
REV. 549, 550–51 (2016); Tara Watson, Inequality and the Measurement of 
Residential Segregation by Income in American Neighborhoods, 55 REV. INCOME 
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While virtually every metropolitan area saw rising inequality 
of household income, not all of them had rising economic 
segregation.  Figure 4 shows household and neighborhood 
inequality values relative to 1970 for specific metropolitan areas.  
New York and Philadelphia both experienced increases in income 
inequality.  The Gini for neighborhoods, however, grew even faster, 
which implies that economic segregation was increasing.  Denver 
and Minneapolis also experienced increasing household income 
inequality, as did almost all United States metropolitan areas.  The 
neighborhood Gini increased in these areas as well, but only in 
proportion to the increase in the household Gini.  In places like 
Denver and Minneapolis, there was more neighborhood inequality, 
but it was mainly due to the increase in household inequality; the 
degree of sorting of inequality within and between neighborhoods 
remained stable.  
 
WEALTH 820, 843 (2009). 
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Figure 4. Household and Neighborhood Inequality in 4 
Metropolitan Areas 
This is an important difference.  Household inequality was 
increasing everywhere, but that was mostly due to factors outside 
of local policymakers’ control—globalization, returns to skill, the 
national economy, etc.  In addition, some places made things worse 
by having more residential sorting of households by income—New 
York, for example, but not Minneapolis.  Much of that could be due 
to suburban sprawl, zoning, school assignment policies, and the 
construction and spatial distribution of different types of housing.  
Richard Rothstein has powerfully described the role of law and 
policy in creating and sustaining racial segregation.44  Likewise, law 
and policy contribute to—indeed, often require—economic 
segregation.45 
Increasing income inequality and economic segregation 
undercut the potential beneficial effects of the decreases in racial 
 
 44. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW 
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 51–57, 77–91, 190–93 (2017). 
 45. Jonathan T. Rothwell & Douglas S. Massey, Density Zoning and Class 
Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 91 SOC. SCI. Q. 1123 (2010); PAUL A. 
JARGOWSKY, ARCHITECTURE OF SEGREGATION: CIVIL UNREST, THE CONCENTRATION 
OF POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2015), http://www.tcf.org/assets/downloads/
Jargowsky_ArchitectureofSegregation.pdf; Editorial, The Architecture of 
Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/
opinion/sunday/the-architecture-of-segregation.html; Michael C. Lens & Paavo 
Monkkonen, Do Strict Land Use Regulations Make Metropolitan Areas More 
Segregated by Income?, 82 J. AM. PLAN. ASSOC. 6, 7–11 (2016). 
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segregation discussed in the previous section.  Inequality, racial 
segregation, and economic segregation interact.46  Because Black 
incomes are so much lower on average than White incomes, 
segregation by race also means that Black neighborhoods will be far 
poorer than White neighborhoods at any given level of economic 
segregation.  Because there is so much inequality among 
households, economic segregation results in greater inequality 
among neighborhoods at any given level of racial segregation.  
Because there is so much racial segregation, economic segregation 
among Blacks produces much poorer neighborhoods than if Blacks 
were interspersed with the much less poor White population.  Thus, 
it is misguided to declare the “end of the segregated century” due to 
a decline in racial segregation when, at the same time, household 
income inequality and economic segregation have been increasing.  
Surely, the decline in racial segregation since the 1970s is evidence 
of progress in both social and legal terms.  However, other things 
are not equal.  The racial segregation that stubbornly persists plays 
out in a very different context; its negative effects are exacerbated 
by substantially higher levels of income inequality and economic 
segregation. 
III. Metropolitan Geography 
Racial segregation has undergone geographic restructuring.  
At the turn of the twentieth century, most Blacks resided in rural 
areas and small towns in the South whereas the White population 
was predominantly Northern and urban.  After the Great 
Migration, however, regional segregation subsided and 
neighborhood-level segregation exploded.47  Douglas Massey notes 
that, starting in about 1950, Blacks and Whites became more 
segregated across municipal boundaries.  Massey goes on to state 
that, “[a]fter 1950 . . . [B]lacks and [W]hites came to reside in 
wholly different towns and cities.”48  This process was driven by 
White flight and suburban sprawl, as new suburbs used land-use 
policies and exclusionary zoning to effectively protect suburban 
Whites from having lower-income and minority neighbors.49  It is 
 
 46. Massey, Rothwell & Domina, supra note 32, at 87–88. 
 47. See Massey & Hajnal, supra note 20, at 534–536. 
 48. Douglas S. Massey, Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Conditions in 
U.S. Metropolitan Areas, in AMERICA BECOMING: RACIAL TRENDS AND THEIR 
CONSEQUENCES 391, 398 (Neil J. Smelser, William Julius Wilson & Faith Mitchell 
eds., 2001).  Massey references his early study with Zoltan L. Hajnal on indices of 
Black/White segregation.  Massey & Hajnal, supra note 20, at 537. 
 49. See generally Jonathan Rothwell & Douglas S. Massey, The Effect of Density 
Zoning on Racial Segregation in U.S. Urban Areas, 44 URB. AFF. REV. 779, 779–82 
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perhaps equally important that White parents were able to send 
their children to predominantly White schools if they could afford 
the entry fees:  the down payment, property taxes, and monthly 
mortgage on a large suburban home.  As Ruth Bader Ginsburg has 
noted, “even though the days of state enforced segregation are gone, 
segregation because of geographical boundaries remains.”50 
The proliferation of suburban jurisdictions, particularly after 
1970, facilitated White flight.  While Blacks have suburbanized, in 
many cases they have moved to older inner-ring suburbs whose 
White populations have moved to newer, more remote suburbs;51 
Ferguson, Missouri, is a case in point.  Newer suburbs where the 
majority of housing units were built after 1970 still tend to be 
disproportionately White and affluent.52  To a large extent, racial 
segregation is driven by jurisdictional boundaries.  In research with 
Deborah Rog and Kathryn Henderson, I computed the Index of 
Dissimilarity using city and suburban jurisdictions rather than 
census tracts as the neighborhood unit.  The Index of Dissimilarity 
represents how much segregation would remain if there was 
complete integration within jurisdiction boundaries.  For example, 
in the Philadelphia metropolitan area, it would be as if every 
neighborhood in Philadelphia had the same share of Whites and 
Blacks as the city as a whole, and the same for the several hundred 
suburbs in the metropolitan area.53  On average, across 384 
metropolitan areas, the level of segregation calculated using 
municipal jurisdictions is three-fourths of the figures discussed 
above using census tracts.54  In other words, if segregation could be 
completely eliminated within cities and towns, three-fourths of 
 
(2009); see also Paul A. Jargowsky, Sprawl, Concentration of Poverty, and Urban 
Inequality, in URBAN SPRAWL: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, & POLICY RESPONSES 39, 
42–48 (Gregory Squires ed., 2002) (exploring how exclusion from the suburbs led to 
racial residential segregation and the concentration of poverty). 
 50. Irin Carmon, Exclusive Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Interview: Full 
Transcript (last update Feb. 17, 2015, 8:06 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/
exclusive-justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-interview-full-transcript. 
 51. See Bernadette Hanlon, The Decline of Older, Inner Suburbs in Metropolitan 
America, 19 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 423 (2008); Katrin Anacker, Christopher Niedt & 
Chang Kwon, Analyzing Segregation in Mature and Developing Suburbs in the 
United States, 39 J. URB. AFF. 819 (2017). 
 52. See Paul A. Jargowsky, Debra J. Rog & Kathryn Henderson, Suburban 
Poverty and Racial Segregation, URB. PUB. 1–8 (2014), https://engaged
scholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2309&context=urban_facpub 
(discussing a “boom” in construction of suburbs in the 1970s and exploring how 
“[W]hite flight was a primary cause in the development of the new suburbs”).  This 
report was prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and 
was reproduced in Urban Publications. 
 53. Id. at 11. 
 54. Id. at 9–11, fig. 6. 
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segregation would still remain because of the segregation between 
metropolitan jurisdictions. 
To the extent that reductions in racial segregation have played 
out in large central cities, the benefits of these reductions may be 
limited if they occurred within fiscally-strapped central cities or 
within aging, deteriorating suburbs.  Although there are a 
bewildering variety of governance structures and divisions of power 
between cities, towns, villages, school districts, counties, special-
purpose districts, and state governments, in no metropolitan area 
are the collection of taxes and the provision of public amenities 
equal across all the subareas that comprise it.55  Hence, in terms of 
access to resources and public amenities such as quality public 
schools, the increasing fragmentation of metropolitan areas since 
1970 effectively undercuts progress in segregation at the 
neighborhood level. 
IV. Segregation, Children, and Access to Opportunity 
Powerful research by Stanford economist Raj Chetty and his 
colleagues demonstrates that the effects of living in segregated and 
impoverished neighborhoods are particularly important for young 
children.56  The longer-term benefits of reductions in segregation, 
therefore, are tied to reducing segregation as it affects the 
neighborhoods where children live and, in turn, the schools they 
attend.  Residential decisions are made by adults, but they are 
affected by the presence and age of children.57  Those adults with 
children are often motivated to seek safe neighborhoods and better 
schools if they have the financial means to do so.58  To the extent 
 
 55. See generally NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (1994) (using data to 
explore what motivated different income and racial groups to demand different kinds 
of taxation, public services, and local government); see also KENNETH T. JACKSON, 
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 130–32 
(1985). 
 56. See generally Chetty, Hendren & Katz, Effects of Exposure, supra note 34 
(analyzing long-term data indicating that children who moved to low-poverty areas 
experienced improved outcomes in areas such as college attendance and income as 
an adult); see also Chetty et al., Land of Opportunity, supra note 34, at 1619–1620. 
 57. See generally W.A.V. Clark & Jun L. Onaka, Life Cycle and Housing 
Adjustment as Explanations of Residential Mobility, 20 URB. STUD. 47 (1983) 
(analyzing how trends in household lifestyle and composition impacts the decision to 
move); PETER H. ROSSI, WHY FAMILIES MOVE: A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
OF URBAN RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 42, 70–80 (1955). 
 58. ANNETTE LAREAU & KIMBERLY GOYETTE, CHOOSING HOMES, CHOOSING 
SCHOOLS: RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND THE SEARCH FOR A GOOD SCHOOL 137–39 
(2014). 
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that some Whites have moved back to central cities in recent years, 
they are likely to be childless, young adults, and empty nesters.59 
These life-cycle considerations often lead to different levels of 
segregation between White and Black children compared to White 
and Black adults.  Figure 5, below, shows the average level of 
segregation of Black and White children enrolled in school by 
education level.60  Segregation of children enrolled in school is 
substantially higher than in the corresponding non-enrolled 
populations.  For example, the Index of Dissimilarity for Whites and 
Blacks not attending primary or secondary school is 0.582, whereas 
Black and White children enrolled in elementary school have an 
Index of Dissimilarity of 0.717, 23% higher.61  White and Black high 
school students are even more segregated, with a segregation score 
of 0.738.62  The residential segregation of children enrolled in 
kindergarten and pre-kindergarten is influenced both by the 
segregation of families with children in that age range and by the 
choices families make about enrolling those children, since these 
schooling levels are not compulsory.  Apparently, families exercise 
their choices in ways that further increase segregation:  children 
enrolled in kindergarten and pre-kindergarten have the highest 
Black/White segregation, measured at 0.798 (37% higher than those 
not enrolled)—reminiscent of the peak segregation levels of 1970.63  
To be clear, this extreme figure is not based on a few highly 
segregated metropolitan areas, but rather, is the nationwide 
average of all 384 metropolitan areas.64 
 
 59. See generally Ingrid Gould Ellen, Keren Mertens Horn & Katherine M. 
O’Regan, Why Do Higher-Income Households Choose Low-Income Neighbourhoods? 
Pioneering or Thrift?, 50 URB. STUD. 2478 (2013) (exploring why higher-income 
households move into lower-income areas). 
 60. The figure and the analysis of this paragraph are based on the 2007–2011 
American Community Survey and are adapted from Paul A. Jargowsky, Segregation, 
Neighborhoods, and Schools, in CHOOSING HOMES, CHOOSING SCHOOLS, supra note 
58, at 97–136. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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Figure 5. Black/White Segregation by School Enrollment 
Because of the residential decisions of parents with children 
and other life-cycle considerations, the declines in racial 
segregation have left children behind.65  Declines in segregation 
that skip over children are less likely to have beneficial effects on 
social and economic outcomes.  Ultimately, to evaluate how much 
progress there has been against segregation, we must pay attention 
to how and why segregation has negative effects.  We must get 
under the hood of the overall segregation levels and investigate who 
remains segregated and how that is likely to affect racial inequality. 
Conclusion 
Edward Glaeser and Jacob Vigdor are two highly acclaimed 
economists, and rightly so.66  They have published prolifically on a 
variety of topics, and their work is widely cited.  However, I 
respectfully disagree with their conclusion that the regime of racial 
segregation of Blacks that began in the early twentieth century has 
ended.  Further, I argue that they have failed to show that the 
“dream” that racial disparities in achievement and employment 
could be ameliorated by reducing racial segregation “was a myth.”  
However, my point in framing this discussion around Glaeser and 
 
 65. Similarly, the increases in economic segregation are driven largely by 
families with children.  The economic segregation of childless families has not 
increased to any appreciable degree.  Owens, supra note 43. 
 66. Edward Glaeser is the Fred and Eleanor Glimp Professor of Economics at 
Harvard University, and Jacob Vigdor is the Daniel J. Evans Professor of Public 
Policy & Governance at the Evans School of Public Policy and Governance at the 
University of Washington.  GLAESER & VIGDOR,  supra note 4. 
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Vigdor’s article is not to attack them, since different scholars will 
always weigh evidence in different ways.  Rather, my point is to 
argue that racial segregation and its consequences need to be 
understood in terms of a broader set of factors that, operating 
together, limit spatial access to opportunity. 
To borrow a concept from economics, Glaeser and Vigdor did a 
comparative statics analysis of segregation.  That is, they looked at 
the changes in racial segregation as if other things were being held 
constant, and noted that though segregation declined, there had 
been “only limited progress” in improving the educational and labor 
market equilibria.67  Beyond the problem of overstating the decline 
in segregation due to their measurement strategy, they did not take 
into account the interaction of racial segregation with growing 
economic segregation, itself driven in part by White flight to the 
suburbs to escape attempts to desegregate schools and housing in 
the central cities.  They also failed to appreciate the way in which 
the impact of racial segregation is magnified by growing income 
inequality and the changing spatial structure of metropolitan areas.  
Further, by not thinking critically about the mechanisms through 
which racial segregation’s harms propagate, they did not 
investigate the extent to which children, and therefore schools, 
remain segregated at levels more common in the 1970s, the height 
of the segregated century. 
To borrow a concept from legal analysis, I argue that the 
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that racial segregation 
is still with us and continues to hold back Blacks, particularly those 
living in racially and economically isolated neighborhoods.  We do 
not yet have reason or evidence to reject the view that integration 
could help to achieve a more equal society because segregation still 
dominates the demographic organization of our nation’s 
metropolitan areas.  We will not be in a position to empirically 
evaluate the potential of reducing segregation until we achieve 
substantial racial integration, particularly if it can be achieved 
without offsetting effects due to increasing inequality, economic 
segregation, and metropolitan fragmentation. 
 
 
 67. See id. at 10. 
